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Abstract 
Airlines are increasingly using regional jets to better match aircraft size to high value 
demand markets, and reduce labor costs.  This has been especially important due to the increased 
pressure on the industry following September 11th 2001, because airlines see regional jets as a 
major part of their financial recovery plan.  The increase in regional jets represents a significant 
change from traditional air traffic patterns and airline business models.  To investigate the 
possible impacts of this change, this study analyzed the economic characteristics of regional jets, 
and well as the emerging flight patterns and performance of regional jets compared to traditional 
jets and turboprops.   
It was found that regional airlines have lower crew costs per number of block hours and take 
offs, but higher crew cost per ASMs and RPMs.  As a result, the revenues at regional airlines are 
more susceptible to changes in crew cost. It was also observed that regional jets operate 
differently then traditional jets.  Regional jets increase the number of operations at airports and in 
the take off tracks around airports, which may result in increased congestion.  Regional jets were 
also observed to exhibit lower climb rates than traditional jets, which may negatively impact air 
traffic control handling and sector design. Given the possible economic and operational problems 
associated with regional jets, their growth may pose unanticipated problems.   
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Introduction 
 
One of the significant emerging changes to the national air space system is the number of 
regional jets, which has been increasing at an exponential rate.  This rapid emergence of regional 
jets can be seen in Figure 1, which shows FAA registration data plotted between the third quarter 
of 1993 and the third quarter of 2002, for some of the regional jets commonly flown in the 
United States.  The figure shows that the growth in regional jets is exponential, with CRJ2 and 
E145 registration data increasing the fastest.  Airlines are moving to regional jet operations for 
two reasons.  First because the smaller aircraft size allows them to better match the aircraft to the 
market, and second because of the reduced labor costs. 
Regional jets have much lower crew costs then traditional jets and as result airlines are using 
them to reduce their overall costs.  However, this cost structure is highly sensitive to changes that 
could potentially make regional jets as expensive as traditional jets.  In addition, regional jets are 
used in much the same way as some traditional jets.  As a result, the two jet types have a high 
level of interaction during climb and cruise.  This interaction could cause new constraints on the 
national airspace system, which may in turn increase congestion and delays.  This paper analyzes 
the possible economic and operational consequence of drastic regional jet growth. 
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Figure 1: Regional Jet Registration Data 
 
Methodology 
 
In order to understand the financial impacts of regional jets, Form 41 data for the second 
quarter of 2002 was used.  The data was grouped by carrier and by plane type to understand the 
cost differences between regional and traditional airlines.   
In order to visualize the emerging trends in the air traffic system, flight data from the 
Aircraft Situational Display to Industry (ASDI) feed was used.  This data is compiled by the 
Volpe center from the FAA’s Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS).  This study used 
data for all aircraft that had a take off time between midnight December 19th, 2002 GMT and 
midnight December 20th, 2002 GMT.  While only one day of data is presented here, data starting 
in April 2002 has been analyzed and showed similar results.  This set of data was broken down 
into four categories based on plane type: the narrow body traditional jets, the wide body 
traditional jets, the turboprops, and the regional jets.   
 
Regional Jet Overview 
 
Currently there are over 800 regional jets flying in the United States, with more than that 
number on firm order [1].  These planes range in size from about 30 to 70 seats, with a new 90 
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seat aircraft to be introduced this year.  The planes are owned by both the major US airlines and 
by regional airlines.  The major airlines tend to include regional jet operations as a separate spin 
off carrier, for example American Eagle for American airlines, or by code sharing with regional 
airlines.  Table 1 shows the aircraft used by each airline as well as the code shares between 
regional and traditional airlines, as of February 2003 [2].  It is interesting to point out that a 
regional airline may have code shares with two competing major airlines, as is the case with 
Atlantic Coast Airlines, which code shares with both Delta and United [1].  
 
Table 1: Regional Airlines and their Code Share Partners 
Aircraft 
Type Regional Carrier Code Share Carrier 
E135 
American Eagle 
Continental 
Express 
Republic 
American 
Continental 
America West, Delta, 
USAirways 
E145 
American Eagle 
Continental 
Express 
Mesa  
Republic 
Trans State 
American 
Continental 
America West, Frontier, 
USAirways 
America West, Delta, 
USAirways 
American, US Airways 
CRJ1 Comair Sky West 
Delta 
Delta, United 
CRJ2 
Air Wisconsin 
Atlantic 
Southeast 
Mesa 
Sky West 
Air Tran, United 
Delta 
America West, Frontier, 
USAirways 
Delta, United 
CRJ7 
American Eagle 
Atlantic 
Southeast 
Comair 
Horizon 
Mesa 
American 
Delta 
Delta 
Alaska, Northwest 
America West, Frontier, 
USAirways 
BA46 Air Wisconsin Air Tran, United 
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The Case for Regional Jets 
 
Airlines originally began purchasing regional jets to replace turboprops, which were not 
liked by passengers.  However, as more regional jets entered the system, airlines began seeing 
other advantages and using them more.  The smaller plane size allows the airlines to better and 
easier match the size of the plane to the size of the market.  It also allows airlines to serve small 
communities that were too far to reach with a turboprop.  The regional jet also allows for a more 
flexible use of the fleet because they perform almost like a traditional jet, but are closer in size to 
a turboprop.  However, the most beneficial factor of using regional jets is the reduced cost of 
labor.  Currently it is much cheaper for an airline to fly a regional jet instead of a traditional jet 
because crew, and especially pilot, costs are significantly lower.  Figure 2 shows the crew costs 
per block hours for a few regional and traditional jets, as of the first quarter 2001 [3].  It can be 
seen that the regional jets have lower costs than the traditional jets. 
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Figure 2: Aircraft Crew Costs per Block hours for 1Q 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
Mozdzanowska, Hansman 7 
Growth of Regional Jets 
 
The growth of regional jet networks is shown in Figures 3, 4, and 5.  These figures show the 
scheduled regional jet flights in 1998, 2000, and 2002 respectively.  The data was obtained from 
the OAG and a straight line was drawn between the origin and destination creating a network 
map.  It is clear from the figures that the number of regional jet flights increases with time, and 
that most of the growth occurs in the north-eastern part of the United States.  The plots also show 
that the regional jet flights are structured around hubs. 
 
 
Figure 3: Regional Jet Network Map in 1998 (Plot Courtesy of Ryan Tam) 
 
 
Figure 4: Regional Jet Network Map in 2000 (Plot Courtesy of Ryan Tam) 
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Figure 5: Regional Jet Network Map in 2002 (Plot Courtesy of Ryan Tam) 
 
Scope Clause Restrictions 
 
While the rapid growth of regional jets is what airlines want, it is not what pilots want.  
Pilots at major airlines feel threatened by regional jet pilots who work for less.  They stand to 
lose either their job or their salary.  As a result, pilots at major airlines have been fighting back 
with scope clauses.  Scope clauses result from labor contracts made with airline pilots; they limit 
the number and size of regional jets that an airline can own and fly.  Given that many airlines 
have been facing serious financial problems since 9/11/2001, many have been trying to 
renegotiate their existing pilot contracts to limit the effect of scope clauses.  Currently, only 
USAirways and United have reached agreements, and both leveraged bankruptcy during the 
negotiations.  However, if the economy does not recover rapidly other carriers may face 
bankruptcy and force their pilots to agree to more lenient scope clause restrictions, which would 
make the regional jet growth even more rapid. 
 
Possible Consequences of Regional Jet Growth 
 
Currently airlines seem to see only benefits in using regional jets.  They are more flexible, 
liked by passengers, and most importantly cheaper.  Airlines are using them as a major part of 
the strategy to recover from the post 9/11 crisis.  However, there are two main issues that may 
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make regional jets a less than ideal solution.  The first problem is that the planes are cheaper only 
because of the current labor cost structure.  If that structure changes, and it looks at though it 
may, the cheapest planes may very quickly become the most expensive.  The second problem is 
that regional jets perform differently then traditional jets and turboprops.  While these 
differences add flexibility, they may also cause higher delays. 
 
Consequences due to Regional Jet Economics 
 
It has already been mentioned that regional jets have lower crew costs than traditional jets.  
Figure 6 shows the crew costs per block hours and per number of take offs for a group of 
regional and traditional airlines, during the second quarter of 2002.  It can be seen that the 
regional airlines have the smallest costs per Block hour and per number of take offs.  This is 
even more impressive when we take into account that they have fewer block hours and fewer 
take offs then the majors, because they fly few planes and shorter routes.  The differences in 
flight lengths can be inferred from the distance between the two bars on the plot, the larger the 
distance the longer the flights.   
 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Tr
an
s 
St
at
es
 A
irl
in
es
Me
sa
ba
 A
vi
at
io
n
Am
er
ica
n 
Ea
gl
e/
Si
m
m
on
s
At
la
nt
ic 
So
ut
he
as
t A
irl
.
Je
t B
lu
e
So
ut
hw
es
t A
irl
in
es
Co
nt
in
en
ta
l A
irl
in
es
No
rth
we
st
 A
irl
in
es
Am
er
ica
n 
Ai
rli
ne
s
Un
ite
d 
Ai
r L
in
es
US
 A
irw
ay
s,
 In
c
De
lta
 A
ir 
Lin
es
Crew Cost/Block Hours
Crew Cost/Take offs
 
Figure 6: Crew Costs per Block Hour and Number of Takeoffs for 2Q 2002 
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Although the regional airlines have lower costs when measured relative to how much they 
fly, they have much higher costs measured relative to RPMs and ASMs.  Figure 7 shows crew 
cost per ASMs and RPMs, and it can be seen that the regional airlines have higher costs then the 
traditional airlines.  This is because the regional airlines fly fewer miles and have fewer seats 
because they have fewer and smaller aircraft.  The difference between the two columns also 
gives an insight into the load factor, the larger the gap the lower the load factor.  It can be seen 
that not only do the regional jets have fewer seats, they also have lower load factors, indicating 
that although they have fewer seats they are still not filling them as well as the major airlines.  In 
addition to carrying fewer passengers, regional airlines also tend to charge lower average ticket 
prices.  As result, it is harder for them to make up the costs of empty seats.   
Despite the fact that regional airlines have low crew costs, their costs per ASMs and RPMs 
are high.  This means that regional airlines have higher costs per passenger, and since they also 
have a smaller overall number of available seats, their revenue making potential is smaller.  As a 
result, the bottom line of regional airlines is more sensitive to cost than that of the majors. 
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Figure 7: Crew Costs per ASMs and RPMs for 2Q 2002 
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Given that the regional airlines are more sensitive to changes in cost, it is necessary to 
examine the likelihood of the costs changing.  There is no direct answer to this question.  
However it is known that the major pilots don’t want their salaries to decrease, and that the 
regional pilots want to make more money.  Currently, the economy is in a downturn and the 
major airlines are suffering.  As a result, now is not a good time to fight for higher pay because a 
low paying job is still better then no job.  However, when the economy recovers and capacity 
picks up, both the regional and major airlines will need new pilots, and the regional airlines will 
have to provide incentives for pilots to stay and not move up to the majors.  In addition, many of 
the major airlines may have to credit their regional carriers for their contribution in keeping the 
airline from bankruptcy.  This will give the regional pilots a bargaining chip that they can use to 
get higher salaries.  
The pilots at one regional airline have already demanded higher pay.  Comair is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Delta, and on March 26, 2001 the pilots went on strike.  They were asking 
for higher pay and benefits, but Delta stood firm and as a result the strike lasted until July 2, 
2001 and cost Delta and estimated $2,000,000 a day [4].  In the end Delta agreed to raise salaries 
and grant partial benefits.  The first year pay was raised from $16,000 to about $20,000 and pay 
for senior captains increased from about $66,000 to $85,000.  While these new salaries are still 
much lower then those at major airlines they constitute a 25% increase in one case and 29% in 
the other, which is quite large [5]. 
 
Consequences due to Regional Jet Operations and Performance 
 
The main issues resulting from an increase in regional jet operations will be focused on 
congestion problems.  Regional jets typically need to use the same runways as traditional jets, 
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whereas turboprops often use shorter ones.  As the number of regional jets increases, they will be 
competing for runway space, and eventually will cause delays and congestion at airports, 
because an increase in regional jet flights means that the number of operations per person will 
increase.   
In addition to the runways, the tracks the planes fly on following take off may become 
congested as a result of increased operations.  Figure 8 shows the flight tracks for planes leaving 
DFW on the 6th of February 2003 between midnight and 5 am GMT time.  The black lines are 
the turboprops, and the light lines are regional and traditional jets.  It can be seen that regional 
and traditional jets align on the same tracks, while turboprops fly on separate routes from all the 
other plane types.  Since there are no regional jets sharing the turboprop routes this means that 
even regional jets that replace turboprops share routes with traditional jets.  As a result, even 
turboprop replacement flights will result in increased congestion.   
 
 
Figure 8: Flight Tracks for Planes Leaving DFW 
 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of flight delays at DFW for the day of February 6th 2003.  
The plot is normalized so the comparison between aircraft categories is not distorted by the total 
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number of planes in that category.  However, for reference there were 674 traditional jets, 253 
regional jets, and 145 turboprops.  The plot shows that traditional jet flights tend to have short 
delays with an average of 20 minutes, while turboprops and regional jets tend to have longer 
delays, but also have a wider range.  The turboprop average delay was 23 minutes and the 
regional jet average delay was 33 minutes.  The traditional jets most likely have the smallest 
delay because the controllers and airlines see them as the priority and schedule accordingly.  The 
turboprops are most likely next because although they affect the traditional jets on take off, they 
turn away shortly after and follow a separate track.  The regional jets pay the highest penalty in 
terms of delay because they compete with traditional jets for runway resources and interact with 
them after take off.  The regional jets are kept waiting on the ground so that the traditional jets 
can have smaller delays. 
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Figure 9: DFW Normalized Delay Histogram 
 
In addition to congestion issues due to an increase in operations, congestion and delay 
problems may also appear due climb performance differences between regional and traditional 
jets.  Figure 10 shows the altitude vs. time plot for flights between CLE and ORD.  It can be seen 
from the plot that both the CRJ and ERJ climb slower then the Boeing or Airbus planes.  The 
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ERJ in particular stands out as having a slower climb rate.  This data represents only one data 
point; however, a number of examples exhibit the same behavior. 
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Figure 10: Altitude vs. Time for Flights from CLE to ORD 
 
The slower climb rate of regional jets increases the range of aircraft performance that 
controllers must understand and anticipate in order to adhere to proper separation standards.  A 
slower climb rate will potentially change how regional jets interact with the sector structure.  
Many of the irregular sector shapes found in the current air traffic management system are a 
direct consequences of modifications targeted at reducing the number of sector boundary 
crossings.  Boundary crossings are avoided because each transition results in increased radio 
communications and coordination workload.  Figure 11 shows a close up of Figure 10 with 
hypothetical sector boundaries imposed on top.  It can be seen from the figure how the slower 
climb performance of regional jets may increase the number of sector boundary crossings.  
Sector boundaries have evolved such that a traditional jet could be handed off directly from one 
sector to another.  However, the slower climb rate of the regional jets may cause them to miss the 
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transition as can be seen in the circled part of the plot.  In this case both the regional jets require 
an additional transition before they reach the same sector as the traditional jets.  To fix this 
problem sector could be restructured to better support the range in aircraft performance.  The 
dotted line on the figure shows the new sector boundary. 
 
 
Figure 11: Effect of Climb Rates on Sector Structure 
 
The problems presented above are based on data during a time of reduced capacity.  When 
the economy recovers, and when all the regional jets on firm order are delivered, the number of 
planes in the national airspace system will drastically increase, and all the problems presented 
above will be magnified.  Even if the cost structure of regional jets does not change, and they 
remain a cheaper alternative to other planes, the cost of delays and passenger dissatisfaction may 
make the lower labor costs less attractive.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Airlines are increasingly using regional jets to better match aircraft size to high value 
demand markets, and reduce labor costs.  This has been especially important due to the increased 
pressure on the industry following September 11th 2001, because airlines see regional jets as a 
major part of their financial recovery plan.  The increase in regional jets represents a significant 
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change from traditional air traffic patterns, and airline business models.  To investigate the 
possible impacts of this change, this study analyzed the economic characteristics of regional jets, 
and well as the emerging flight patterns and performance of regional jets compared to traditional 
jets and turboprops.   
It was found that regional airlines have lower crew costs per number of block hours and take 
offs, but higher crew cost per ASMs and RPMs.  As a result the revenues at regional airlines are 
more susceptible to changes in crew cost. It was also observed that regional jets operate 
differently then traditional jets.  Regional jets increase the number of operations at airports and in 
the take off tracks around airports, which may result in increased congestion.  Regional jets were 
also observed to exhibit lower climb rates than traditional jets, which may negatively impact air 
traffic control handling and sector design. Given the possible economic and operational problems 
associated with regional jets, their growth may pose unanticipated problems.   
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